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United Nations' Peace-keeping Role in
the Post-Cold War Era: The Conflict
in Bosnia-Herzegovina
I. INTRODUCTION
There has long been a notion that every individual has certain
inviolable fundamental rights, including, among other things, the
right to "life, liberty, and the security of person."' These basic
human rights are not granted by the sovereign to an individual by
virtue of his or her citizenship. Rather, they are universal rights
retained by every individual that supersede state boundaries and
territorial limitations. In recognition of this, the United Nations
("U.N.") has, since its inception, declared its policy of protecting
these fundamental rights2 and delegated to itself certain powers
and responsibilities to further this purpose.3
With the end of the Cold War and the creation of a "new
world order,"4 it may be necessary for the world's peace-keepers to
adjust to different needs of the global community in order to fur-
ther the cause of international peace and stability. While the threat
of strategic nuclear war has subsided, many former Soviet republics
and Eastern European states are in transition and, as each asserts
its independence and autonomy, the future of these nations is un-
certain. Peaceful transition to independence and self-determina-
tion of these states are crucial to the new world order. Yet, current
events in Eastern Europe reveal that this transition is difficult. In
the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the six republics making up
the former Yugoslavia, the road to independence has been far from
peaceful. Since the day its citizens voted for independence from
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) art. 3, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., pt. 1, at 71-77, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948).
2. E.g., U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The Preamble states in pertinent part: "Determined
... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small .... And for
these ends, to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security." Id.
3. Peace-keeping powers of the U.N. are enumerated in Chapters VI (Pacific Settle-
ment of Disputes) and VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the Charter. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 33-51.
4. In this Comment, the author refers to the global political structure of the post-
Cold War era as the "new world order."
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the Yugoslav Federation on March 1, 1992, there has been non-
stop fighting among the ethnically divided forces.5 Despite efforts
by the U.N. and nations such as the United States, Great Britain,
and France to obtain cease-fire and diplomatic settlement of the
conflict, the fighting has not only continued, but escalated, result-
ing in tens of thousands of casualties. 6 There also have been count-
less incidents of the most egregious human rights violations, such
as rape and torture,7 the worst in Europe since World War 11.8
The U.N. initially responded to the conflict by repeatedly de-
manding an unconditional cease-fire 9 and initiating a trade em-
bargo against the remaining Yugoslav Federation, which has been
suspected of assisting the Bosnian Serbs carry out their acts of ag-
gression.10 Additionally, the U.N. passed a resolution to deliver
humanitarian aid to the victims of the aggression in Bosnia, author-
izing the use of force to carry out this objective. The atrocities
did not stop, however, and the Government of Bosnia-Herzego-
vina repeatedly asked the U.N. for deployment of military force in
order to stop the war.12 The whole world has turned to the U.N.
for a solution to this problem; eighteen months into the conflict,
however, there is a growing concern that the U.N. is incapable of
effectively dealing with the problem. The situation calls for a
closer look at the role of the U.N. as the keeper of world peace and
order and for an examination of the Organization's effectiveness.
5. See infra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
6. John F. Burns, Serbs Are Voting on Peace Plan; Signs of Rejection Are Apparent,
N.Y. TimS, May 16, 1993, § 1, at 1. "An estimated 150,000 to 200,000 people in Bosnia"
are dead or have disappeared as a result of this conflict, and an additional 2 million people
have been expelled from their homes. The victims are mostly Muslims. Id
7. John F. Bums, 150 Muslims Say They Raped Them in Bosnia, N.Y. TnMES, Oct. 3,
1992, § 1, at 5. The War-Crimes Commission reported in October 1992 that as many as
12,000 women and girls have been raped since the war began. The victims are mostly
Muslims, and some as young as 14 years old. Id
8. Stephen Engelberg & Chuck Sudetic, Conflict in the Balkans: In Enemy Hands-
A Special Report; Clearer Picture of Bosnia Camps: A Brutal Piece of a Larger Plan, N.Y.
TimEs, Aug. 16, 1992, § 1, at 1; Elaine Sciolino, Abuses by Serbs the Worst Since Nazi Era,
Report Says, N.Y. TnEs, Jan. 20, 1993, at A8.
9. For a discussion of the cease-fire demands and their impact, see infra note 117 and
accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of Yugoslav involvement in the conflict, see infra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text.
11. S.C. Res. 770, U.N. Doc. S/RES/77O (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1468. See also
infra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
12. Alija Izetbegovic, the President of the newly-recognized State of Bosnia-Herzego-
vina, first appealed for international intervention in early April 1992. Stephen Engelberg,
Fighting Imperils Efforts To Halt War in Yugoslavia, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 11, 1992, § 1, at 1.
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This Comment will analyze: (1) the U.N.'s adherence to the non-
interventionist policy and the viability of the policy in today's inter-
dependent world; (2) the special considerations due where massive
violations of human rights are involved; and (3) the current posi-
tion of the U.N. in the area of human rights and its effectiveness as
the world's "peace-keeping force," discussed in light of the recent
events in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
II. NON-INTERVENTIONIST PRINCIPLE
A. General International Law
International law typically requires states to adhere to non-
interventionist policy. This policy is derived from and supports the
notion of state sovereignty, which is the crux of our governing Law
of Nations.13 Observation of non-interference with the affairs of
an individual state is necessary to protect the sovereignty of that
state, which, in turn, is essential for the maintenance of world
order:
[I]ntervention implies the violation of sovereignty; and sover-
eignty is one of the fundamental norms regulating interaction in
the system. In addition to sovereignty, and flowing from it, are
territorial integrity and the legal equality of states. These make
up a triad of cornerstones guiding the external actions of states.
Observance of these three primary rules forms the basis for the
maintenance of order in the international system, and implicit in
each of them is the idea of non-interference in the domestic af-
fairs of one state by another. Intervention, by disregarding
these rules, and especially that of sovereign authority, chal-
lenges the basic pillars of order in the system.14
Non-interventionist policy was originally adopted to limit per-
missible action by one sovereign state upon another;15 however, it
13. For a discussion of various theoretical bases for non-intervention and inviolability
of state sovereignty, see CAROLINE THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERVEN-
TION 11-16 (1985).
14. Id. at 1-2. See also Jost Delbrtlck, Commentary on International Law: A Fresh
Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Authority of the United Nations, 67 IND. LJ.
887, 889 (1992) (discussing how the principle of non-intervention is an integral part of
general international law and, as such, excludes third party intervention).
15. See THOMAS, supra note 13, at 16. Widespread opinion among scholars is that
non-interventionist policy prohibits individual states from intervening forcibly in the affairs
of another state. Even where lives are being threatened, such humanitarian intervention is
considered illegal. Delbrtick, supra note 14, at 890. See also infra notes 67-69 and accom-
panying text.
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has also become the generally accepted norm for multinational and
international entities.16 Thus, the U.N. also subscribes to this pol-
icy. Article 2(7) of the Charter states: "[N]othing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settle-
ment under the present Charter .... ,,17
B. What Is a "Domestic Affair?"
While generally following the non-interventionist policy, the
language of Article 2(7) prohibiting intervention in the domestic
affairs of a state does not clearly define the outer limitation on
international intervention. 8 Characterizing activities as falling
within or outside the scope of "domestic affairs" is often a difficult
matter. Increasing interdependence among states in today's global
community creates many gray areas, compounding the problem.
What starts out as a "domestic affair" often escalates to involve
neighboring states; often, conflicts that are physically contained
within a state nonetheless have a great impact on the rest of the
world. Thus, Article 2(7) does provide an exception: "this princi-
ple [of non-intervention] shall not prejudice the application of en-
forcement measures under Chapter VII. ' 19 Chapter VII, in turn,
allows the Security Council to take measures to "maintain or re-
store international peace and security" where it finds "the exist-
ence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of
aggression."20
The vague terminology in Article 2(7) and Article 39 has gen-
erated a substantial amount of debate over the issue of permissible
intervention.21 If the affair is domestic, the U.N. may not inter-
vene; if it is international, it may. Where a conflict clearly falls into
one category or the other, determining the limits of permissible in-
16. For a discussion of the development and acceptance of non-intervention as a uni-
versal norm governing multinational and international entities, see THOMAS, supra note 13,
at 22-48.
17. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7 (emphasis added).
18. See i
19. Id.
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 39 provides: "The Security Council shall deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or
restore international peace and security." Id.
21. See infra part III.C.
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tervention under the Charter is an easy matter. Problems arise,
however, when the affair has both domestic and international ele-
ments. The question becomes: under what circumstances, if any,
does a matter essentially within "domestic jurisdiction" nonethe-
less fall within the scope of permissible intervention because of the
threat it poses to "international peace and security?" 22
In order to reconcile Article 2(7) and Article 39 in these situa-
tions, several approaches have been developed. One approach is
to read Chapter VII as supplementing the non-interventionist pro-
vision set forth in Article 2(7).23 Professor O'Connell interprets
the two provisions as follows: "Under the Charter, the Organiza-
tion may not interfere in the internal affairs of member states.
Moreover, the Charter prohibits the Security Council from taking
enforcement action except in response to threats to international
peace and security." 24 Based on this reading of the Charter,
O'Connell suggests that the U.N. is authorized to intervene only
where the matter is overtly international in character, in other
words, if there is international aggression. 25
A different approach reads Chapter VII as the primary provi-
sion determining the permissible scope of international interven-
tion that is narrowly limited by the domestic affairs limitation set
forth in Article 2(7).26 This reading of the Charter provisions gives
the Security Council a broader discretion to determine whether an
affair is one of international character taking it out of the "domes-
tic jurisdiction of the individual state," 27 thereby allowing for inter-
vention. Unless exercised with proper discretion, this approach
could render Article 2(7) meaningless, because it places the au-
thority to invoke the exception in the hands of the very organiza-
tion whose powers the provision was designed to limit.28
Nonetheless, many scholars assert that this approach is workable. 29
22. See U.N. CHARTER art. 39, supra note 20.
23. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Commentary on International Law: Continuing Limits
on UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. LJ. 903 (19921.
24. Id. at 903 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
25. See id at 904.
26. See N.D. WHrrE, THE UNrrED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNA-
TIONAL PEACE AND SECURrrY 50-51 (1990).
27. Id.
28. Professor O'Connell has criticized this approach as an "interpretation... [that] is
at odds with the spirit in which the Charter was written." O'Connell, supra note 23, at 911.
29. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE 376-81 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
7th ed. 1952).
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Professor Oppenheim argues that the Security Council should be
able to intervene in matters of international concern, as long as
there are procedural safeguards.30 He observes:
The action of the Security Council can legally extend to inter-
vention, but seeing that, as a rule, that body is competent only
with regard to matters which affect or constitute a threat to in-
ternational peace and security, such matters, having become the
subject of direct international concern, are no longer essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of a State and as such excluded
from intervention on the part of the Security Council.31
The procedural safeguard Oppenheim refers to is the requirement
that the determination of the domestic or international character of
an affair be made "by an impartial finding either of the competent
non-judicial organs of the United Nations or, if these bodies are
unable to reach a decision, because of the exigencies of the voting
procedure or for other reasons, by the judicial organ of the United
Nations, namely, the International Court of Justice." 32
This broad interpretation of Chapter VII allows for interna-
tional intervention on a broader range of circumstances. Thus, de-
pending on the approach taken, the scope and application of the
U.N.'s peace-keeping power is greatly enhanced or diminished.
C. The Conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina: "Domestic" or
"International?"
The current conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an example of
an affair that is particularly difficult to characterize as "domestic"
or "international." Bosnia-Herzegovina had been experiencing
major ethnic tension for centuries, and the recent violence there
erupted in March 1991, when the republic voted in a popular refer-
endum to become independent from the former Yugoslav Federa-
tion.33 The Bosnian Serbs, who comprise approximately thirty-one
30. Id.
31. Id. at 380. See also Delbrilck, supra note 14, at 892.
Oppenheim asserts that "[ilt is probable that the only legally relevant... purpose of
[Article 2(7)] is to prevent intervention . . . [by] the United Nations in such matters as
regulation of tariffs and admission of aliens with regard to which some States have tradi-
tionally exhibited particular apprehension of international interference." 1 OPPENHEim,
supra note 29, at 381.
32. 1 OPPENHEiM, supra note 29, at 377-78 (footnote omitted).
33. E.g., John F. Burns, Vance Ends Yugoslav Trip Confident That U.N. Plan Will
Proceed, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 7, 1992, § 1, at 6. Federation of Yugoslavia was comprised of six
republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro.
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percent of the population, boycotted the referendum in an effort to
thwart independence. 34 The Serbs wanted to remain part of the
Yugoslav Federation where they comprised a majority, instead of
becoming a minority in the new independent State of Bosnia-Her-
zegovina.35 When their efforts failed, they responded with acts of
violence on the Muslim-Slavs and the Croats, who comprise the
remainder of the Bosnian population.36 What began as sporadic
violence immediately following the referendum soon escalated into
civil war, with reports of detention camps, genocide, rape, and tor-
ture.37 Furthermore, the Serbs are forcing large numbers of Mus-
lim-Slavs to leave Bosnia in an attempt to create an exclusively
Serbian region: "a greater Serbia."
38
The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when it first erupted, was
a classic example of a fight for self-determination in a newly estab-
lished state; thus, it seemed to fall clearly in the realm of "domestic
affairs" within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.
Like many local conflicts, however, the situation in Bosnia-Herze-
govina quickly manifested international dimensions, as other states
became involved in the struggle. For example, it soon became ap-
parent that the Yugoslav National Army was assisting the Serbian
cause by providing planes, weapons, and even manpower.39 As
the conflict escalated, Belgrade readily conceded its support for
Of these, Croatia, Slovania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina gained international recognition of
their independence in April 1992. David Binder, U.S. Recognizes 3 Yugoslav Republics as
Independent, N.Y. TImEs, Apr. 8, 1992, at A10. The U.N. recognized Macedonia's inde-
pendence in April 1993. Howard Libit, Macedonian Envoy Pursues Uncertain Career, L.A.
TimEs, June 29, 1993, at AS. Serbia and Montenegro remain in the Federation. Binder,
supra.
34. David Binder, U.S. Set To Accept Yugoslav Breakup, N.Y. TrMEs, Mar. 12,1992, at
A7.
35. See Chuck Sudetic, Bosnia Calls Up Guards and Reserve, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 5,
1992, § 1, at 1.
36. Id.
37. See Engelberg & Sudetic, supra note 8 (describing human rights violations occur-
ring in the region and giving first hand accounts of the atrocities). See also Burns, supra
note 7.
38. See John F. Burns, Serb Is Confident of Holding Occupied Lands, N.Y. TiMES,
May 19, 1993, at A10; see also Engelberg & Sudetic, supra note 8.
39. Michael T. Kaufman, Yugoslav Denies Involvement of Belgrade in War in Bosnia,
N.Y. TimEs, June 6, 1992, § 1, at 1. During the initial phase of the conflict, President of
Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, vehemently denied that Yugoslavia was involved in the fight-
ing in Bosnia and insisted that the conflict was strictly a "civil war" within Bosnia. Id
Even then, however, U.N. observers and human rights workers reported air strikes by Yu-
goslav forces and observed that "Bosnian Serbs could not operate at the level that they did
without aid and assistance." Id.
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the Bosnian Serbs/h Furthermore, Croatia, whose own war with
Serbia had halted in January 1992, has also become deeply in-
volved in the conflict because of the large number of ethnic Croats
present in Bosnia.41 Viewed in this light, the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina has both an "international" and a "domestic" charac-
ter. The fact that Serbs are claiming the right to annex parts of
Bosnia to the existing Serbian Republic 42 is further evidence of the
international nature of the conflict, as such an act would be an out-
right invasion of a sovereign state. Under these circumstances,
does the U.N. have the authority, pursuant to Chapter VII of the
Charter, to forcibly intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina to put an end
to the conflict?
The Security Council apparently did not view the Yugoslav
National Army's involvement as a green light to intervene milita-
rily in the affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, accordingly, its re-
sponse has been slow and cautious. In an attempt to keep the
conflict from escalating, the U.N. demanded that the Yugoslav
Government withdraw from the matter and imposed severe eco-
nomic sanctions against the state until it complies.4 3 By passing the
resolution prohibiting Yugoslav involvement, the U.N. attempted
40. President Milosevic declared in December 1992 that, despite all threats, Serbia
would not abandon her "great solidarity with Serbian people outside Serbia." John F.
Burns, Conflict in the Balkans; Serbia's Enigma: An Aloof Leader Who Stoked Fires of
Nationalist Passion, N.Y. TuAEs, Dec. 22,1992, at A16.
41. Seven-month-long battle between Croatia and Serbia was halted in January 1992,
when both parties signed a U.N. peace plan. The plan allowed for deployment of U.N.
peace-keeping troops to oversee the disarmament of the Serbian forces in the area and the
return of Serb-occupied territories to Croatia. The Security Council has repeatedly passed
resolutions condemning the Croatian offensive and demanding a cease-fire. The Croats,
however, have ignored the demand. See Chuck Sudetic, Clashes Persist on Yugoslav Coast
Croats Report Pushing Back Serbs, N.Y. TmsEs, Jan. 26, 1993, at A8; Chuck Sudetic, U.N.
Says 'Stop Shooting!' but Croats Shoot Anyway, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 27, 1993, at A3. The
Croatian forces are now deeply involved in the conflict and have secured 20% of Bosnian
territory. Carol J. Williams, Defiant Bosnia Parliament Rejects Foes' Partition Plan, L.A.
TirwMs, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al.
42. See John F. Bums, Conflict in the Balkans; Nationalist Says Serbs' Rejection of
Pact Means the End of Bosnia, N.Y. TInEs, May 17, 1993, at Al.
43. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. Doc. S/RES1757 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1453. It pro-
vides in pertinent part:
The Security Council_ ...
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations ....
4. Decides that all states shall prevent:
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported there-
from after the date of the present resolution; ....
252 [Vol. 16:245
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to keep the affair from escalating into a full-scale international
conflict. Its position also amounted to an implicit recognition that
the conflict was of a domestic nature and one in which other states
should not become involved. As it soon became painfully clear,
however, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, merely containing the conflict at
the national level will not solve the underlying problem of human
rights violations. Thus, the question facing the U.N. is whether it
has the power to intervene in situations involving egregious human
rights violations, even where it has determined that the matter is
"essentially domestic."
III. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Protection of Human Rights as an Important U.N. Goal
Despite the general policy of non-intervention in domestic af-
fairs, there are strong arguments that special considerations war-
rant some form of intervention where a conflict involves massive
human rights violations.44 The proponents base their arguments on
the language of the U.N. Charter.4 5 In addition to the Preamble of
the Charter, which emphasizes the importance of the preservation
of "fundamental human rights... [and] dignity and worth of the
human person," 46 Article 1(3) of the Charter declares that one of
the purposes of the U.N. is to achieve "international cooperation
... in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." 47 Moreover, as Article 55(c) of the Charter
(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their
flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, whether or not originating
in their territories, but not including supplies intended strictly for medical pur-
poses and foodstuffs . . . to any person or body in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia....
5. Decides that all States shall not make available to the authorities in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial
or public utility undertaking in the Federal Republi of Yugoslavia... any funds
or any other financial or economic resources... except payments exclusively for
strictly medical or humanitarian purposes and foodstuffs.
Id.
44. See Delbrtlck, supra note 14, at 901; MICHAEL WA It, JUST AND UNJUST WARS
89-90 (1977).
45. See MANOUCHEHR GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RImHTS 113-
39 (1962).
46. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., supra note 2.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 1 3.
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articulates, the U.N. has the function of promoting "universal re-
spect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.'"4
In order to carry out its function as the protector of human
rights, the U.N. must have the means of ensuring that those rights
are in fact protected. Thus, Oppenhein writes: "The Charter of
the United Nations, in recognising the promotion of respect for
fundamental human rights and freedoms as one of the principal
objects of the Organisation, marks a further step in the direction of
elevating the principle of humanitarian intervention to a basic rule
of organised international society. '' 49 He notes that this is so de-
spite the fact that "the Charter itself expressly rules out interven-
tion in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the State. ''50
In addition to the Charter, the U.N. has adopted the Declara-
tion of Human Rights51 and numerous other resolutions52 to pro-
tect human rights. International conventions have also passed
declarations urging observance of such fundamental rights.5 3 To-
gether, these documents clearly indicate that the U.N. considers
the protection of human rights to be a very important agenda. The
question is whether these documents empower the U.N. with the
authority to intervene in the affairs of a state where those rights
are being violated.
B. The United Nations' Authority To Intervene
The U.N.'s repeated emphasis on the importance of basic
human rights suggests that the Organization has implicit authority
48. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, c.
49. 1 OPPEmrmiM, supra note 29, at 280 (footnotes omitted).
50. Id. (footnote omitted).
51. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1.
52. E.g., Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 9, 1975,
G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976);
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, adopted Nov. 25, 1981, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
53. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (1976); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res.
39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985).
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to carry out some form of intervention in order to protect these
rights. Those who advocate strict adherence to the non-interven-
tionist policy, however, do not give credence to this argument.5 4
According to the traditional non-interventionist concept of interna-
tional law and its relationship to state sovereignty, laws attain bind-
ing force only to the extent that sovereign states either expressly or
implicitly consent to those laws.5 5 Furthermore, even where a state
consents, the rights and obligations created by those laws only gov-
ern the state and do not implicate individual rights, which are
wholly within the sphere of domestic governance.5 6 Accordingly,
the U.N.'s declarations regarding human rights are merely guide-
lines for states to follow, not an authorization for intervention.5 7
Thus, under this theory, there simply is no right "to intervene in
civil war only to protect human rights and not to affect the out-
come of the civil war."95 8
The non-interventionist interpretation of the relationship be-
tween international law and state sovereignty is difficult to accept,
however, because it fails to recognize that a law or a policy lacks
legitimacy if no means of its enforcement exist. Repeated declara-
tions of a principle, purpose, or function are meaningless if the
U.N. lacks the authority to implement them. Professor D'Amato
writes: "[A] Security Council condemnation that is not followed by
any forcible action on the part of the Council is another way of
saying to the ostensibly offending state, 'we have to condemn you.
verbally, but don't worry, we're not going to do anything about
it.' 59 Similarly, Oppenheim notes that reading the U.N.'s declared
principles as mere guidelines would have "the effect of nullifying
much of the purpose of the Charter and of reducing it ... to the
category of a purely political instrument."60 The U.N. must not
have such severe limitations placed on its enforcement powers if
54. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 23.
55. Bartram S. Brown, International Law: The Protection of Human Rights in Disinte-
grating States: A New Challenge, 68 CHi.-KE rr. L. REv. 203, 204 (1992).
56. See id.
57. See Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individ-
uals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. Rv. 1 (1982).
58. O'Connell, supra note 23, at 908 n.38. O'Connell writes, for example, that "while
the human rights of the Kurds are a matter of international concern, violation of interna-
tionally protected human rights does not trigger the Security Council to use force." Id. at
904.
59. ANTioNY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECr 231 (1986)
(footnote omitted).
60. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 377.
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the Organization is to maintain its function as the world's peace-
keeping power. Peace-keeping is, after all, the very reason for the
birth and existence of the Organization. 61 Therefore, the U.N.
must be given actual authority to carry out its principles, purposes,
and functions.
In support of recognizing the enforcement powers of the U.N.,
many scholars argue that the Charter, U.N. declarations, and inter-
national conventions make up "international customary law." 62 As
such, the principles they set forth are not mere guidelines. Rather,
they are laws, binding all states to abide by those principles.6 3 Pro-
fessor Sohn asserts that "[the Charter is the] constitution of the
world, the highest instrument in the intertwined hierarchy of inter-
national and domestic documents, [and] prevails expressly over all
other treaties, and implicitly over all laws, anywhere in the
world."6 Furthermore, the Declaration of Human Rights, accord-
ing to Sohn, is equally binding: "[The Declaration] was a continua-
tion of the Charter and shared the dignity of that basic document.
It merely expressed more forcefully rules that already were recog-
nized by customary international law." Thus, Sohn concludes
that
[t]he Declaration ... is now considered to be an authoritative
interpretation of the U.N. Charter, spelling out in considerable
detail the meaning of the phrase "human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms," which Member States agreed in the Charter to
promote and observe. The Universal Declaration has joined the
Charter of the United Nations as part of the constitutional struc-
ture of the world community. The Declaration, as an authorita-
61. Asbjorn Eide, Outlawing the Use of Force: The Efforts by the United Nations, in
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SEcuRrry
99, 99 (1987).
62. D'AMATo, supra note 59, at 124. See also Sohn, supra note 57, at 12. Professor
Sohn writes: "The pyramid of documents, with the Charter at its apex, has become a verita-
ble internationalization and codification of human rights law .. " Id. For a discussion of
what constitutes "customary international law," see D'AmATo, supra note 59, at 124-31.
63. Professor D'Amato argues that "the multilateral conventions containing prohibi-
tions against genocide, torture, and slavery constitute evidence of customary law binding
upon all states and not just the parties thereto." D'AMATO, supra note 59, at 124 (emphasis
added). Similarly, Professor Bartram Brown notes: "It is beyond dispute that a customary
international law of human rights does now exist, and thus even states which are not par-
ties to any of the [human rights] treaties ... have human rights obligations under custom-
ary international law." Brown, supra note 55, at 210. See also Sohn, supra note 57, at 12,
16-17.
64. Sohn, supra note 57, at 13 (footnote omitted).
65. 1d at 15.
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tive listing of human rights, has become a basic component of
international customary law, binding on all states, not only on
Members of the United Nations.66
Furthermore, concerns that originally gave rise to the non-in-
terventionist policy do not apply to international organizations in
the same way they do to individual states. The non-interventionist
policy was necessary in order to limit the scope of permissible in-
terference by one sovereign state upon another.67 Granting broad
powers of intervention to individual states would allow a state, es-
pecially a powerful one, to further its own selfish interest by using a
conflict of a domestic nature, such as violation of human rights, as
a justification to intervene.6 Professor Delbruick writes:
Countermeasures [by an individual state] even against grave and
massive human rights violations are, for good reason, consid-
ered to be restricted to economic and diplomatic sanctions be-
low the threshold of the use of force: Allowing military
enforcement measures based on the "isolated" decisions of indi-
vidual states would lead to an erosion of the general prohibition
against the use of force and against "dictatorial interference[s]."
Since the assessment of the factual situation, the determination
of the appropriate means to be applied, and the execution of the
intervention would all be administered by the intervening state,
the door to purely arbitrary intervention, that is, acts of aggres-
sion in disguise, would be wide open.69
Although this is a legitimate concern, it is unfounded where the
intervening actor is an international organization such as the U.N.
Because the U.N. is comprised of many states, it is unlikely that all
the states would have the same "selfish" motives to intervene in
affairs of any particular state. The multinational structure of the
Organization functions as a check on individual states. Thus, the
Organization would not intervene in domestic affairs of a state for
any illegitimate purposes, but rather to achieve goals common to
all participating states-maintenance of international peace and
protection of the fundamental rights of humanity. 70
66. Id. at 16-17.
67. See THoMAs, supra note 13, at 16.
68. See CHARLES R. BErrz, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 85
(1979). Beitz notes that experience supports the assumption that "governments are seldom
impartial and hence would be unlikely to make correct judgments about the interests of
people on whose behalf they claim to be intervening." Id
69. Delbrack, supra note 14, at 890-91 (footnote omitted).
70. Asbjorn Eide, Director of the Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, argues:
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Additionally, special considerations are due where the "do-
mestic" affair involves a violation of human rights because the
rights of individuals who make up the state are more fundamental
than the rights of a state as a sovereign entity:71 "The end of states
and governments is to benefit, serve and protect their components,
human beings; and the end of international law must also be to
benefit, serve and protect human beings, and not its components,
states and governments." 72 Thus, where a violation of human
rights is at issue, the U.N. possesses the authority to intervene be-
cause such an intervention is legitimized by a "legal restriction" on
state sovereignty. 73 Even Michael Walzer, generally a strong pro-
ponent of strict adherence to the non-interventionist policy, re-
gards massive violation of human rights as one of the very limited
instances where intervention is legitimized.74 Walzer argues that
the claim of state sovereignty loses its force when "the bare sur-
vival or the minimal liberty" of a substantial number of its mem-
bers is at stake: "Against the enslavement or massacre of political
opponents, national minorities, and religious sects, there may well
be no help unless help comes from outside. '75 Thus, there are
forceful arguments for allowing international intervention.
In light of these arguments, it seems unquestionable that the
egregious human rights violations taking place in Bosnia-Herzego-
As a rule, [humanitarian] intervention through the use of armed force should not
be accepted, since it tends to be coupled with illegitimate political purposes, seek-
ing to make the state into which the humanitarian intervention takes place submit
to the will of the intervening state. If the United Nations... expressly endorses the
call for humanitarian intervention, and if the principle of proportionality is main-
tained in the pursuit of such intervention, it would probably be in conformity with
the emerging international legal order.
Eide, supra note 61, at 118-19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Professor Beitz supports this idea as well, although he does not allege that the U.N.
will maintain impartiality under all circumstances. BErrz, supra note 68, at 85.
71. Fernando R. Teson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv.
53, 54 (1992).
72. Id.
73. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 29, at 274. Oppenheim lists seven circumstances where
even a state may have a right to intervene, one of them being "[where] a State in time of
peace or war violates such rules of the Law of Nations as are universally recognized by
custom." Id. at 276. Especially in light of the fact that an international organization is
more objective and more likely to serve the best interests of the state at war, the U.N.
would certainly have the right to intervene in this kind of situation as well.
74. WALZER, supra note 44, at 90. Walzer writes: "[T]he ban on boundary crossing is
subject to unilateral suspension ... when the violation of human rights within a set of
boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community or self-determination or 'arduous
struggle' seem cynical and irrelevant, that is, in cases of enslavement or massacre." Id.
75. Id. at 101.
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vina require some form of intervention. The aggressors in the con-
flict there have clearly violated the rights of the individual citizens
of Bosnia-Herzegovina as set forth in the U.N. Charter and the
Declarations. Moreover, such an intervention should not spark a
concern about "selfish" motives. No individual nation (except for
Serbia and Croatia, who are parties to this conflict) is attempting to
assert control over the sovereignty of the state or to influence it
politically, economically, or ideologically. Rather, the interest is
strictly a collective one that aims to halt the atrocities being com-
mitted against the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question
then becomes: what forms of intervention are permissible?
C. Permissible Forms of International Intervention
1. Humanitarian Aid
The International Court of Justice has declared that delivery
of humanitarian aid is a legitimate form of intervention.76 It thus
appears that delivery of humanitarian aid is recognized as a legiti-
mate use of the U.N.'s peace-keeping powers.77 Where, as in the
case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Government itself asks for such
aid, its legitimacy cannot be questioned.
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes it apparent, how-
ever, that sending humanitarian aid into a state in the midst of a
violent conflict is not as simple as it may seem. The U.N. has been
delivering aid to the victims of aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina
pursuant to the resolution of May 15, 1992.78 Yet, delivery of food
and medical supplies has been very difficult.79 To ensure safe deliv-
ery of aid, the Security Council passed another resolution dispatch-
ing peace-keeping troops in order to reopen the airport near
Sarajevo. Resolution 761, passed on June 29, 1992, states in perti-
nent part:
76. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 242 (June
27). In discussing the legitimacy of the activities against Nicaragua, the Court stated:
"There can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces
in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objectives, cannot be regarded as
unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to international law." Id.
77. Even Professor O'Connell concedes that intervention strictly limited to delivery
of humanitarian aid is permissible. See O'Connell, supra note 23, at 906.
78. S.C. Res. 752, U.N. Doc. S/RES752 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1451.
79. See U.N. Convoy Is Attacked on Edge of Sarajevo as More Units Arrive, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1992, at A6; Serbs Still Shelling, Threatening Airlift, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 5, 1992, § 1, at 6.
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Noting the considerable progress reported by the Secretary
General towards securing the evacuation of Sarajevo airport...
[and u]nderlying the urgency of a quick delivery of humanita-
rian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs,
1. Authorizes the Secretary General to deploy immediately ad-
ditional elements of the United Nations Protection Force (UN-
PROFOR) to ensure the security and functioning of Sarajevo
airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance....
2. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to comply fully
. .. in particular to maintain an absolute and unconditional
cease-fire; ....
4. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate
fully with UNPROFOR and international humanitarian agen-
cies and organizations and take all necessary steps to ensure the
safety of their personnel; in the absence of such cooperation, the
Security Council does not exclude other measures to deliver hu-
manitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs .... 80
Despite the resolution, Serbian forces did not comply with the
cease-fire demand, and delivery of aid has remained difficult, leav-
ing tens of thousands of Bosnians without food or medication.8'
Furthermore, sending humanitarian aid into a state is ineffec-
tive because it often does not extinguish the underlying problem.
Human rights violations are hardly mitigated if the aggressors still
have the means and the drive to continue killing, torturing, and
driving people from their homes. Although the Security Council
passed another resolution on August 13, 1992, authorizing use of
"all necessary measures" to ensure that relief supplies reach their
destinations, 2 such measures may be undertaken only for the pur-
pose of assuring safe delivery of supplies and not for the general
purpose of ending the civil war.83 This limitation unfortunately
prevents the U.N. from protecting the human rights of the Muslim-
80. S.C. Res. 761, U.N. Doc. S/RES/761 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1462 (emphasis
added).
81. The State Department has concluded that the relief effort in Bosnia is "largely a
failure, with the Serbian forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina skimming nearly one-quarter of
all the aid brought in by air." Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Finds Serbs Skimming 23% of
Bosnian Aid, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 13, 1993, at Al.
82. S.C. Res. 770, supra note 11 (emphasis added). The resolution specified that such
military action may be carried out either "nationally or through regional agencies or ar-
rangements." Id.
83. Id.
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Slavs in Bosnia. Although the resolution may encourage the Serbs
to allow humanitarian supplies to get through so that they can
avoid a military attack by the peace-keeping troops,84 the problem
in Bosnia is not limited to starving people and the shortage of med-
ical supplies. The problem encompasses countless incidents of
murder, torture, rape, and displacement of people from their
homes. Merely assuring the safe delivery of food and medical sup-
plies will not eliminate these problems. Although sending humani-
tarian aid may help the victims of aggression to survive a little
longer and may placate our sense of morality, it does not stop the
atrocities committed in violation of basic human rights.85 Some
other form or forms of intervention becomes necessary under these
circumstances.
2. Negotiation
Article 33 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the U.N. to initiate
and oversee peace settlement negotiations. The provision states:
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and secur-
ity, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, me-
diation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of
their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon
the parties to settle their disputes by such means."
Thus, the U.N. clearly has the authority to call upon parties to the
conflict to participate in a negotiation process.87 In fact, overseeing
84. See John F. Bums, U.N. Envoys Resume Effort To Get Food into Sarajevo, N.Y.
TimEs, June 12, 1992, at A6.
85. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina has criticized the U.N.'s position, accus-
ing it of being "'a dirty game by the international community,' in which the United States
and other nations, unwilling to risk intervening militarily, were trying to create the impres-
sion of helpfulness when their officials knew that the Serbian forces had powerful reasons
not to comply with the Security Council plan, or to delay it long enough for many in the
city to starve." Burns, supra note 84.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 33 (emphasis added).
87. See id. Article 33 has been interpreted to mean that the Security Council's in-
volvement is discretionary. "[T]his means that the Security Council has a duty to remind
the parties to a dispute of their option to solve a dispute by resort to such peaceful means
as have been indicated in Article 33, paragraph 1." Bengt Broms, The Role of the United
Nations in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, in THE UNrrED NATIONS AND THE MAINTE-
NANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECuRrry, supra note 61, at 73, 75. However, the
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negotiation and mediation is considered to be the U.N.'s primary
means of maintaining international peace and order.8a
The peace plan being negotiated among the ethnic foes in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina, however, increasingly appears to be ineffective in
ending the bloody conflict. The peace talks, originally coordinated
by Cyrus R. Vance and Lord David Owen, began in January 1993
in Geneva and called upon the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims to come to an agreement to end the war.89
The initial plan, centered on a map dividing the state into ten
largely-autonomous provinces that are loosely tied together by a
central government, faltered after months of unsuccessful negotia-
tions.9° It appears that the U.N.'s attempt to create "safe havens"
in parts of Bosnia to protect the Muslims led to the collapse of the
plan.91
The current plan under negotiation no longer attempts to
maintain Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single, unified state. Instead,
the plan divides the embattled state into three ethnic provinces92
and contains a provision allowing for the eventual annexation of
Security Council's power in this context is limited to making recommendations; the Coun-
cil does not have the power to bind parties to its decisions. Id at 76.
88. Broms, supra note 87, at 75-76.
89. See David Binder, Balkan Factions Begin New Talks, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 3,1993, § 1,
at 1.
90. 1& The map envisioned three provinces predominantly Muslim, one predomi-
nantly Serbian, and five in which the Muslims would share power with either the Croats or
the Serbs. None of the provinces were to be "ethnically pure," and Sarajevo was to be
demilitarized and declared as an "open city." Id. See also David Binder, Bosnia's Bitter
Enemies Sit Down and Talk in Geneva, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 4, 1993, at A3. Although the
Bosnian Croat leader, Mate Boban, and the Bosnian Serb leader, Rodovan Karadzic,
agreed to the plan, Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian Muslim leader and President of the
Republic, refused to sign the plan. David Binder, Some Progress Reported in Bosnia Talks,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1993, at A3. Even though Izetbegovic accepted the general principle of
the plan to divide the country into decentralized, largely autonomous provinces, he refused
to accept the plan in its entirety and particularly opposed the boundaries of the provinces
as drawn up by Mr. Vance and Lord Owen. Izetbegovic also demanded that Karadzic and
Boban agree to make Bosnia a "sovereign, independent and democratic" republic which
would remain multi-ethnic. I4.
91. See Carol J. Williams, Shaky Bosnia Pact Ready for Tuesday Signing, L.A. TIMEs,
Sept. 18, 1993, at Al. Even though the U.N. attempted to create six "safe havens" in
various parts of Bosnia, it did not deploy any of the 7,600 troops it had planned to send to
protect these areas. As a result, all six designated havens are now surrounded by Serbian
forces. Id.
92. Under this plan, the Bosnian Serbs will maintain control over 52% of the terri-
tory, and the Croats will control 17% of the land. The remaining 31% will be Muslim
territory. Carol J. Williams, Mediators Scramble To Save Pact Bosnian President Dislikes,
L.A. Trnms, Sept. 20, 1993, at A4.
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Serbian and Croatian controlled provinces to Serbia and Croatia.93
Although the Serbian and the Croatian leaders are willing to sign
the current plan, which grants the two forces virtually everything
they want, the Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic is not willing to
accept it. Izetbegovic opposes the plan, which leaves the Muslims
with thirty-one percent of the territory,94 because it rewards the
aggressors by granting them territory that they had taken by
force. 95 Although Izetbegovic seems to concede that there remains
no hope of reestablishing a unified Bosnian State in the land torn
by eighteen months of bloodshed, he is demanding more territory
and access to the Adriatic Sea.96 He has also declared that he will
not sign the peace agreement unless the United States and other
NATO countries will guarantee commitment of troops to enforce
the plan.97 Without acceptance by all three parties, a peace agree-
ment cannot be reached.
If the negotiations fail, then what is the U.N. to do? What
alternative measures are left for the Organization to protect inter-
national peace? As the United States has been considering since
before the negotiation talks began, military intervention may be
the only way to end the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 98 Thus,
the fundamental debate on the role of the United Nations' peace-
keeping powers is whether military intervention can be justified as
a means to end the war itself.
93. Williams, supra note 91.
94. Williams, supra note 92.
95. Williams, supra note 41. Izetbegovic has described the proposed settlement as "a
choice between 'just war' and 'unjust peace."' Id.
96. Williams, supra note 92. In response to Izetbegovic's demand for access to the
Sea, the Croatian leader replied, "We will never concede any Croatian territory." Id.
97. Stanley Meisler, Bosnian President Renews Plea To Lift Arms Embargo, L.A.
TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1993, at A10. Thus far, NATO has offered to send 50,000 peace-keepers to
monitor enforcement if all parties sign the agreement. id. There are no details as to their
participation, however, due to the disputes among the parties. Williams, supra note 41.
The current position of the United States is that it will not send in substantial forces
until after "limited advance NATO deployments" determine that the agreement is holding.
Doyle McManus, U.S. Conditions for Bosnia Troops Include Escape Clauses, L.A. TiMEs,
Oct. 6, 1993, at A4.
98. John F. Burns, War's Pendulum: A Special Report; Bosnia 1992: New Puzzles in
the Jigsaw of Violence, N.Y. TimEs, Dec. 31, 1992, at Al. Western governments, especially
the United States, have been leaning toward a tougher policy involving military interven-
tion, which would initially take the form of air patrols to enforce the Security Council's
flight-ban order passed in October 1992. Id.
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3. Military Intervention
Arguments against the use of military force in order to end
human rights violations are derived from the general policy of non-
intervention.99 This position holds that because civil war is a power
struggle within a state, the nature of the affair is essentially domes-
tic.10o Military intervention in domestic affairs violates the sover-
eignty of the state by depriving the state of its right to self-
determination. As important as human rights are to international
peace and security, they do not override the fundamental interest
in state sovereignty, as long as the violation does not directly affect
affairs in other states. Professor O'Connell writes: "[T]he Security
Council may take action only to 'maintain international peace and
security.' ... [It] must avoid interfering in internal affairs of mem-
ber states by altering a state's political arrangements." 101 She thus
concludes that the only time the U.N. has a legitimate authority to
deploy military force in a state in the midst of a civil war is "after
receiving the consent of all the parties to the conflict."'1
2
A growing number of scholars, however, do not agree with the
non-interventionist view. One argument against such a limitation
on the U.N.'s peace-keeping powers is that international law is the
paramount law governing international relations and thus implic-
itly preempts any contrary state law.103 As members of the interna-
tional community, states have an obligation to abide by the terms
of international law.104 Therefore, "there is no matter which by its
very nature is essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of states
or which cannot be regulated by a general or individual norm of
international law.... [A] matter is within the domestic jurisdiction
of a state as long as there exists no general or individual rule of
international law which governs it."105 Thus, human rights matters
99. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
100. Professor O'Connell asserts that civil wars "have always been viewed as ... inter-
nal matter[s]." O'Connell, supra note 23, at 911 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 904-05 (footnotes omitted).
102. Id. at 909 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
103. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
104. Professor Sohn writes:
The Covenants and national constitutions or laws are meant to coexist .... Where
the Covenants go beyond a domestic law in protecting a particular right, the state
concerned has the duty to adopt any additional legislative or other measures that
may be necessary to give effect to the right recognized in the Covenants.
Sohn, supra note 57, at 21.
105. See GANJI, supra note 45, at 134 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). As to the
notion that protection of human rights is a state's obligation toward its own citizens, Pro-
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do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of a state, as there .are
rules of international law that govern the area, and would therefore
be subject to international regulation.
Others have found justification for military intervention in the
text of U.N. documents and through actual conduct of the U.N.1°6
First, as to the Members of the Organization, the General Assem-
bly and the Security Council have held that human rights violations
committed by sovereign states are not "matters . . . essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction . . . ,,"7 as they are violating the
Charter provisions protecting human rights to which they are
bound.10 8 Furthermore, Professor Delbrtick argues that Article
2(7) does not prohibit the Security Council from invoking Chapter
VII of the Charter when the affair involves acts of aggression on a
large scale, for such "military threats to the peace by their very na-
ture are not internal matters of the member states. Measures taken
against such acts or threats, therefore, could never constitute an
illegal intervention under international law and would, therefore,
not need to be expressly excepted from the nonintervention princi-
ple of Article 2(7)."109 Moreover, Delbrtick observes that it is
often only a matter of time before an aggression involving gross
violation of human rights does become an overt threat to interna-
tional peace and security: "It is only realistic to assume that mas-
sive human rights violations of genocidal dimensions will sooner or
later escalate into international military conflicts in a world highly
sensitized by such events." 110
Many have expressed such a concern in regards to the events
taking place in Bosnia-Herzegovina."' This fear is particularly jus-
tified because the main goal of the Serbs in this conflict is to create
an ethnically homogeneous Serbian State. Hence, they are un-
fessor Ganji asserts that the existence of such an obligation does not make an affair exclu-
sively domestic; rather, "a state may be held responsible if it fails to fulfill these obligations
which are 'primarily' its concern." Id. n.67 (footnotes omitted).
106. See Delbrtlck, supra note 14, at 893.
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7, supra note 17.
108. Delbrflck, supra note 14, at 893.
109. Id. at 897 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
110. Id. at 900.
111. See Carol J. Williams, Regional Outlook, Buried Balkan Tension Rumbling to Sur-
face, L.A. TimEs, Aug. 3, 1993, World Report, at 1. As early as August 1992, then Secre-
tary of State, Lawrence S. Eagleberger, expressed concern that fighting in Bosnia-
Herzegovina could spread southward. David Binder, U.S. Worries Balkan War Could
Spread, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1992, § 1, at 3.
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likely to stop the aggression once Bosnia has been "cleansed."11 2
In fact, in the Serbian Province of Kosovo, nearly two million eth-
nic Albanians are being terrorized by "60,000 Serbian police,
soldiers and paramilitary gang members." 113 The situation in Ko-
sovo is particularly dangerous because the area contains "a high
concentration of troops and weapons." 4 Furthermore, any Ser-
bian attack in Kosovo is likely to draw Albania, Macedonia, and
Montenegro into the conflict, leading to a region-wide war.
115
Moreover, reports indicate that Serb nationalist forces have
been "harrassing" the Muslim Slavs and the Hungarian minority in
neighboring regions.n 6 Eastern Europe is a very volatile area be-
cause of its many ethnic divisions, and the U.N.'s failure to halt the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is encouraging other states and eth-
nic groups to follow suit in attempts to gain independence and con-
trol. When such possible dangers are considered, it is indeed
difficult to dismiss the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a mere
"domestic concern."
IV. EFFEcrrvENss OF THE UNITED NATIONS' PEACE-KEEPING
EFFORTS
A. The Current Situation in Bosnia
The current complex situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina illumi-
nates the ineffectiveness of the U.N.'s peace-keeping powers. In
response to the conflict, the U.N. has repeatedly demanded perma-
nent and unconditional cease-fire and peaceful settlement. More
than a dozen cease-fire agreements have been signed and immedi-
ately ignored." 7 The U.N. has also been delivering humanitarian
112. George Kenney, a former State Department official in charge of Yugoslavia, be-
lieves that the Serbs' territorial gain in Bosnia through aggression will encourage them, as
well as other national extremist forces, to engage in similar acts of aggression in the future.
He predicts that "there is about a 100% chance of the conflict spreading if we just wash our
hands of Bosnia," and that "'ethnic cleansing' will be the way of the future." Williams,
supra note 111.
113. Id. Kosovo is a formerly autonomous province where Albanians comprise 90% of
the population. David Binder, Bush Warns Serbs Not To Widen War, N.Y. TimES, Dec. 28,
1992, at A6. Tension between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians there has been increasing
since late 1992. Id.
114. Binder, supra note 113.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. "[C]ease-fire... came and went like its predecessors..... There was not so much
as a pause for the 6 p.m. cease-fire deadline." John F. Bums, Sarajevo Sees Likeness in
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aid to the victims of the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
delivery of food and medical supplies, however, has been largely
unsuccessful. 118 Although the Security Council passed a resolution
instituting a flight-ban over parts of Bosnia on October 9, 1992,119
its reluctance to enforce the ban' 20 has been obvious to the Serbs,
who have repeatedly violated the mandate with impunity.121 Fi-
nally, peace talks, which are probably the last chance for a peaceful
settlement of this conflict, seem to be faltering. 122 Even if all three
parties to the conflict signed the agreement, there is no guarantee
nor serious likelihood that the parties will observe its terms. Serbia
and Croatia have repeatedly reneged on their promises. Moreover,
the people of the three ethnic groups, especially the Muslims, who
have suffered eighty percent of the total number of casualties in
this conflict, 123 will not be satisfied with a peace agreement that
merely establishes the status quo. While their leaders sit around a
table in Geneva and try to work out an agreement, people continue
to kill and beat one another at home.'24 The parties may have
been able to resolve their problems through negotiation if it had
been initiated much earlier in the conflict, when the physical and
psychological wounds of the war were not so deep. It appears,
however, that the attempts to negotiate a settlement came too late.
Whether the peace talks fail or manage to halt the aggression tem-
porarily, some kind of military intervention seems inevitable.
In the meantime, the people of Bosnia are losing faith in the
U.N. Many have given up hope and are now hostile towards the
Beirut War, N.Y. TmiEs, June 1, 1992, at A3. See also Frank J. Prial, U.N. Council Acts on
Bosnia Airport, N.Y. TIrm:s, June 9, 1992, at All; Williams, supra note 91.
118. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
119. S.C. Res. 781, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1477. See also
Paul Lewis, U.N. Bans Flights in Bosnia but Is Silent on Enforcement, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 10,
1992, § 1, at 3.
120. In passing the resolution, the Security Council refused to authorize enforcement
of the ban because of its fear that such authorization could exacerbate the problem by
turning the Serbs against the U.N. peace-keeping forces stationed there. Lewis, supra note
119. Instead, it promised to "consider urgently the further measures necessary to enforce
[the] ban" in the event that Serbs violate it. Id
121. Chuck Sudetic, Serbian Planes Said To Kill 19 After U.N. Ban, N.Y. TiMES, Oct.
11, 1992, § 1, at 10. Less than 24 hours after the ban went into effect, Serbian air attacks
killed at least 19 people and wounded 34. Id
122. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
123. Burns, supra note 98.
124. See Binder, supra note 89; Williams, supra note 91.
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U.N.125 Many are blaming the U.N. for the continued violence in
their country. 126 The U.N. Secretary-General was jeered in the
streets of Sarajevo on his visit to the Bosnian capital in January
1993.127 Those who still cling to hopes that the U.N. will come to
their aid are protesting its inaction by refusing to accept the aid
sent to them. Their protests may seem ungrateful, yet they show
how benign this form of intervention really is. What will the
United Nations do? What can the United Nations do?
B. Need for a Reassessment of the United Nations' Peace-
keeping Powers
The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly illustrates the
need for the U.N. to reassess and redefine its role as the peace-
keeping agent of the world. Additionally, its Member States must
rethink their role as Members of the Organization and redevelop
their responsibilities as such. The Organization and its Members
must come to terms with the fact that the world is no longer bi-
polar. The issue today is one of global world order.
A major flaw in the U.N. Charter, as it is applied today, is that
it has not developed a standard that is applicable to situations that
are arguably both domestic and international in character. Lack of
development of the law in this area is understandable. The Organi-
zation was formed at the end of World War II, when the main con-
cern of all nations was to avoid the recurrence of another world
war-clearly an international conflict. This may explain why the
Charter assumes that conflicts fall neatly into either the "domestic"
or the "international" category. The lack of express intent, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that the Charter intended to pro-
hibit intervention in circumstances involving massive violation of
human rights, such as the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Plausi-
bly, the drafters did not feel compelled to develop a standard of
action because they did not foresee the likelihood of such occur-
rences. Certainly, the world was not nearly as interdependent in
1945 as it is today.
125. John F. Bums, Sarajevans Jeer as U.N. Leader Urges Restraint, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
1993, at Al.
126. Id. One severely wounded commander said to the Secretary-General upon his
visit: "We want you to stop the shelling. We believe you are responsible for the continua-
tion of the suffering." Id.
127. Id.
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The end of the Cold War has had a tremendous effect on the
international political climate and, indeed, has substantially altered
the basic concepts underlying the relationships among states in the
post-war era. The world is no longer defined in terms of "East
versus West," or "Communism versus Democracy." The focus of
international relations is no longer the nuclear threat and the arms
race between the superpowers. The threat of a World War III be-
tween the East and the West has, for the time being, largely sub-
sided. At the same time, the end of the Cold War-and the fall of
Communism and the Soviet Union-has caused a massive reorgan-
ization of Eastern European states. Bosnia-Herzegovina is only
one of many states struggling to establish its sovereignty.
The occurrence of civil war is certainly not a new phenome-
non. The Western world's reaction to civil war, however, is consid-
erably different today because there is no longer a fear that the
Soviet Union will take over and establish yet another communist
state. The fear of communism certainly made many civil wars an
immediate international concern to the Western states. Because of
the East-West paradigm, there was never a need, until now, to con-
sider whether human rights violation was in itself a sufficient threat
to international peace to warrant intervention. In fact, there have
been many instances where intervention, although in a large sense
humanitarian, was justified on other, more self-serving, grounds.
128
While the threat of communism is no longer prevalent, the viola-
tion of human rights remains ubiquitous. It is time for the U.N. to
reassess its policy on intervention based solely on human rights
grounds.129 "International law must be capable of changing and
128. See Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85
AJ.I.L. 117, 122 (1991). Examples are the Vietnam War, U.S. intervention in Panama
following authoritative denunciations by Organization of American States ("OAS"), and
U.S. intervention in Grenada following authoritative denunciations by the U.N. General
Assembly. Id.
Farer uses these examples to argue for the general consensus, held throughout this
period, that intervention based solely on human rights claims is not permitted under the
Charter as originally written. See id. The author goes on to conclude, however, that
"claims of human rights are becoming more clamorous and more effective. The carapace
of national sovereignty begins to dissolve. The law, even as traditionally perceived and
proved, is changing." Id. at 127.
129. Brian Urquhart, former U.N. Under Secretary General for Special Political Af-
fairs, advocates the recognition of a third category of international military operation. He
writes:
At the moment, the U.N. has basically two military options. The first is tradi-
tional peacekeeping-that is, forces that can only be deployed after a cease-fire is
in place, that are accepted by the parties to the conflict and that may only use
1993]
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adapting to the realities of the international system, just as it has
adapted to such changes in the past."130
As many scholars observe, there are ample justifications for
humanitarian intervention.131 To be a legitimate part of the inter-
national community, there are certain obligations that each state
must undertake. A state is bound by international law because
compliance with its obligations is essential to world peace and or-
der. This argument is particularly convincing when inviolability of
state sovereignty is analogized to self-autonomy of the individ-
ual.132 A citizen of a state is bound by the laws of that state be-
cause his or her compliance with the law is necessary to maintain
peace and order. If an individual's right to self-autonomy is contin-
gent upon his or her compliance with the laws of the state, it fol-
lows that the rights of a state as a sovereign entity are also
contingent upon its compliance with international law. And, if a
state may legally deprive an individual of self-autonomy for violat-
ing the law, international law must also allow for ways to compel a
state to comply with its fundamental laws, by force if necessary.
Furthermore, intervention can be justified without frustrating
the purpose of Article 2(7). The express exception to the "domes-
tic jurisdiction" rule of Article 2(7)133 suggests that its drafters ac-
knowledged the existence of situations where an affair has
sufficient international consequences to allow for collective inter-
vention under Chapter VII, even though it may also fall within the
scope of domestic jurisdiction. This interpretation is consistent
with the original purpose behind the non-interventionist policy-to
limit permissible interference by one sovereign state upon an-
other.134 Because similar concerns do not exist with regards to in-
force in self-defense. The second option is a large-scale collective enforcement
action like that in Korea in 1950 or, under Chapter VII of the Charter, in Kuwait
in 1991-both under the leadership of the United States.
A third category of international military operation is needed, somewhere between
peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement. It would be intended to put an end to
random violence and to provide a reasonable degree of peace and order so that
humanitarian relief work could go forward and a conciliation process could com-
mene.... [S]uch troops would be required to take, initially at least, certain com-
bat risks in bringing the violence under control.
Bryan Urquhart, Who Can Stop Civil Wars?, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 29, 1991, § 4, at 9 (emphasis
added).
130. Brown, supra note 55, at 204.
131. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
132. THOMAS, supra note 13, at 12.
133. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7, supra note 17.
134. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
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tervention by the U.N., Article 2(7) should not be read so strictly
as to prohibit entirely intervention in circumstances not involving
overt acts of international aggression. The fear that the U.N. might
abuse such authority is justified; however, there are proper safe-
guards.1 35 The Security Council must follow proper procedures to
ensure that the necessity of intervention is objectively
determined.136
Corollary to the theoretical reassessment of the U.N.'s peace-
keeping powers is the need for individual states to rethink their
role as Members of the Organization. During the Cold War, many
states were willing to spend money, send troops, and fight wars in
the name of international peace because civil war, they felt, was a
threat to their own security as individual states. 137 Today, however,
states do not feel directly threatend by civil war, and Members of
the U.N. are therefore less willing to send in troops. 138 Although
the reluctance of states to risk the lives of their people and spend
their money is understandable, 39 and the U.N. should certainly at-
tempt to resolve a conflict without the use of military force, Mem-
ber States must also recognize that they have a duty to provide
such forces when necessary. Article 43 of the U.N. Charter pro-
vides: "All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute
to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake
to make available to the Security Council... forces, assistance and
facilities.., necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security."1 0 Member States, particularly those on the
Security Council, have veto powers enabling them to avoid invok-
ing Article 43. These nations must put aside their own self-inter-
ests, however, and assume their responsibilities as the keepers of a
global world order.
135. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
136. Id.
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
138. Michael Walzer remarks: "States don't send tfieir soldiers into other States, it
seems, only in order to save lives." WALZE R, supra note 44, at 101.
139. The Clinton Administration recently stated that deep human suffering in Bosnia-
Herzegovina "does not justify the extreme costs [of military action]." Doyle McManus,
Military Downplayed in U.S. Role Overseas, L.A. TiMS, Sept. 22, 1993, at A4. An Aus-
trian Foreign Ministry Official has noted, however, that "[tihe cost of stopping the war
does not go away simply because the international community wants it to.... The cost only
goes up with time, like any bill that is not paid." Williams, supra note 111.
140. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, € 1.
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V. CONCLUSION
The non-interventionist policy of international law is sound as
a general policy and should be adhered to whenever possible.
Moreover, when intervention does become necessary, the U.N.
must first seek resolution to the conflict through peaceful means
such as negotiation, coupled, perhaps, with humanitarian aid. Mili-
tary intervention must be a last resort. When all peaceful means
fail, however, the Organization must be capable of intervening mil-
itarily to end a civil war where innocent people are being killed,
raped, and otherwise deprived of their basic rights. 141 Such capa-
bilities are essential to effective international peace-keeping, for
the U.N.'s failure to resolve violent conflicts of this nature is fatal
to the legitimacy of the Organization. Future aggressors will ig-
nore U.N. mandates with impunity. The situation in Bosnia is in-
dicative of a loss of the U.N.'s legitimacy.142 The conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina has escalated beyond imagination. The U.N.
must now concede that this matter is not a "domestic" one calling
for observance of the non-interventionist policy. The war in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina is a regional conflict directly involving several
neighboring states, and is a matter of great international concern.
Failure to resolve this matter will cause even greater damage to the
legitimacy of the Organization.
Furthermore, failure to end conflicts involving massive viola-
tions of human rights is contrary to U.N. policies and objectives. 143
One of the primary objectives of the Organization is to protect fun-
damental rights of individuals. 144 Therefore, the U.N. has a duty to
ensure that such rights are in fact protected. Where individual
states can work out their own conflict, the U.N. can and should
141. Professor Broms states that "[p]eaceful activity is to be chosen in the first place
and in all those cases where Chapter VI [of the Charter] suffices. The Organization should
refrain from resorting to the means mentioned in Chapter VII. These are not resorted to
unless the situation makes it absolutely necessary." Broms, supra note 87, at 75 (emphasis
added). It is the author's position that the conflict in Bosnia and the egregious violations
of human rights committed there have escalated to the extent that invoking Chapter VII
has become absolutely necessary.
142. Many experts have expressed a concern that the U.N. is losing its legitimacy as a
result of its inability to resolve the conflict in the Balkans and elsewhere. See Stanley
Meisler, News Analysis; Heady Prospects for Global Role Turning into a U.N. Migrane,
L.A. TnMEs, Aug. 18, 1993, at A8. Brian Urquhart notes: "There is a real danger that the
Security Council will become irrelevant.... There is a danger that you're pulling all the
wheels and pushing out smoke but not doing anything." Id.
143. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
144. id.
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adhere to its traditional role as a mediator and a peace-keeper. As
the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly illustrates, however, this
will not always be possible. Bryan Urquhart writes:
There is one large argument in favor of [a new type of interna-
tional force]. The unraveling of national sovereignty seems to
be a feature of the post-cold war period. In more and more situ-
ations, only firm and evenhanded intervention from the outside is
likely to put an end to self-perpetuating bloodshed and the pro-
gressive ruin of once peaceful human societies.145
Bosnia is one such situation, and it will not be the last. Therefore,
the U.N. must be prepared to deal effectively with such violations
of peace.
First, the Security Council must take it upon itself to initiate
negotiations and oversee their process at a much earlier phase in
the conflict, as soon as it becomes clear that the conflict is of inter-
national concern-Controlling the crisis during an earlier phase
will increase the possibility of peaceful reconciliation because there
would have been less bloodshed; the less damage done, the more
willing the parties would be to end the conflict peacefully.
Second, the U.N. must be capable of enforcing its military
threats against the aggressors. It must convey to the aggressors a
willingness to carry out its threats by having equipment ready and
forces on call. A showing of actual readiness to use force, and not
mere verbal condemnation, would increase the likelihood that
U.N. mandates will be observed.
Finally, the U.N. must be willing to and actually carry out mili-
tary intervention where its necessity is objectively apparent. This,
in turn, means that the Member States must contribute troops,
equipment, and funds to enable the Organization to carry out such
a mission. It must be emphasized, of course, that such military in-
tervention is a last resort.14
145. Urquhart, supra note 129 (emphasis added).
146. Speaking at the annual meeting of the London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies, NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woemer, noted that there are some
"bitter lessons" to be learned from our "passivity" in dealing with the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. He observed:
Political solutions and diplomatic efforts will only work if backed by the necessary
military power and the credible resolve to use it against an aggressor.
If you cannot or do not want to help the victim of aggression, enable him to help
himself.
Threaten only if you are determined to implement the threat.
1993] 273
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It may be true that the U.N. is essentially a peace-keeping, not
a war-fighting force.147 However, how is the U.N. to keep peace, if
it is not also authorized to make it? If a state is peaceful, the U.N.
may act to maintain that peace; however, once that state of peace is
destroyed, the U.N. cannot act because it is not the Organization's
job to make peace. The inherent problem with this approach is
that it cannot maintain peace, if peace does not exist. Mr. Ur-
quhart comments: "the problem is that without a cease-fire there
can be no peacekeeping force, but without a peacekeeping force a
cease-fire is unlikely." 148 If this is the way the U.N. is to carry out
its peace-keeping missions, there will be no international peace nor
security of fundamental human rights in the near future.
Yoshiko Inoue*
Crisis prevention, like deterrence, will work only if your resolve to prevent con-
flict is credible and accompanied by firm action.
William Tuohy, Alliance Has No 'Will' for Military Effort in Bosnia, NATO Chief Says,
L.A. TiMEs, Sept. 11, 1993, at A15.
147. See O'Connell, supra note 23, at 904-05.
148. Urquhart, supra note 129.
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